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Why do politicians distort public investments? And given 
that public investments are poor because presumably that 
is what is politically rational, what types of reforms are 
likely to be both efficiency improving and compatible 
with the interests of politicians? This paper explores these 
two questions in the context of Mongolia. It argues that 
Mongolian members of parliament have an incentive 
to over-spend on smaller projects that bring benefits to 
specific geographical localities and to under-spend on 
large infrastructure that would bring economic benefits 
to Mongolia on the whole. The incentive for the former 
is that members of parliament internalize the political 
benefits from the provision of particular, targeted 
benefits to specific communities. The disincentive for the 
latter is that large infrastructure carries a political risk 
because the political faction in control of that particular 
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ministry would have access to huge rents and become 
politically too powerful. The identity of these “winners” 
is uncertain ex ante, given the relatively egalitarian and 
ethnically homogenous nature of Mongolia’s society and 
polity. Anticipating this risk, members of parliament 
are reluctant to fund these projects. Since these large 
infrastructure projects are crucial for national growth, 
neglecting them hurts all members of parliament. 
Members of parliament will therefore support reforms 
that collectively tie their hands by safeguarding large, 
strategic investment projects from political interference 
thereby ensuring that no political faction becomes too 
powerful. This protection of mega-projects would need 
to be part of a bargain that also allows geographical 
targeting of some percentage of the capital budget. 1 
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Investments  are  a  key  to  economic  growth  and  in  developing  countries  public  investments  in 
infrastructure, education, and health are necessary to provide public goods, address market failures, crowd 
in private investments, and achieve redistributive goals.  However, public investments are often the most 
politically visible and discretionary forms of public expenditures, and are therefore strongly influenced by 
political  considerations,  thereby  undermining  their  quality.  These  political  pressures  are  particularly 
pronounced in resource-rich countries — as is often noted, the resource curse is primarily a political and 
not  economic  phenomenon.
1  A  fundamental question therefore, is how can public investments be 
improved in developing countries given these political constraints?  More specifically, given that public 
investments are poor because presumably that is what is  politically rational, what types of institutional 
and organizational reforms are likely to be both efficiency improving and compatible with the interests of 
these actors? 
 
This paper addresses this question in the context of Mongolia, a natural resource (copper and coal) rich 
and rapidly transforming economy that is presently attempting numerous structural reforms along the 
length of the natural resource ―value chain‖ but which also faces many of the risks associated with the 
resource curse.  An effective public investment system is essential for avoiding the Dutch disease and for 
translating natural resources underground into productive assets above ground.  However, Mongolia‘s 
public investment management system is weak and has been unable to allocate resources well or in the 
most cost effective manner.  With the large infrastructure investment needed to both develop the new 
mines in the Southern Gobi (estimated at $5 billion, or roughly 100% of GDP) and to benefit from them, 
improving this system is a central and urgent priority.  The issue of which technical solutions will be 
politically viable is therefore, of considerable importance to the country‘s future development.     
 
The paper‘s approach is to apply the lessons from the considerable academic political economy literature 
in attempting to answer this question.  The key political actors in the analysis are Mongolia‘s members of 
parliament (MPs), the reason being that Mongolia is a parliamentary democracy in which the parliament 
exercises considerable budgetary authority and the public investment system is hugely influenced by the 
interests  of  individual  MPs.    Drawing  on  this  literature,  the  paper  identifies  three  perverse  political 
incentives that need to be addressed if public investments are to improve in Mongolia. 
 
First, MPs have an incentive to over-spend on smaller projects that bring benefits to specific geographical 
localities, and which, given Mongolia‘s geography, tend to be uneconomic, and to under-spend on large 
infrastructure that would bring economic benefits to Mongolia on the whole.  The reason is that while 
Mongolian MPs internalize the political benefits from the provision of particular, targeted benefits to 
specific communities, they have a disincentive to make the large infrastructure investments for which 
they will share credit with others.  In particular, given the weaknesses in the public investment system, the 
provision of large infrastructure carries the risk that the political faction in control of that particular 
ministry would become politically too powerful.  Anticipating this risk, MPs are reluctant to fund these 
projects.    
 
Second, even those projects that are a priori economic are compromised in their implementation through 
poor planning and appraisal, procurement irregularities, and weak monitoring.  The award of contracts to 
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technically unqualified but politically well-connected construction companies is a major political reason 
for these implementation problems as these contracts provide the avenue for electoral campaign finance.   
 
Third, there is little incentive for political actors to maintain capital assets as evidenced by the chronic 
under-funding of capital maintenance and repairs, and the resultant deterioration of physical assets.  This 
neglect  of  maintenance,  resulting  in  a  ―build-neglect-rebuild‖  feature  for  infrastructure  is  a  common 
occurrence in developing countries, and is reflective of MPs short time horizons linked with the election 
cycle.   
 
Mongolia shares these problems with many developing countries.  However, encouragingly, there are a 
number of features in Mongolia that also suggest that reform is possible.  First, compared to other young 
democracies, Mongolia is a relatively stable two-party system, and this existence of at least two parties 
that  are  capable  of  winning  office  greatly  enhances  electoral  accountability.    Second,  although 
Mongolia‘s  political  parties  are  factionalized  they  are  more  programmatic  —  i.e.  have  some  shared 
corporate policy objectives — and disciplined than is the case in many other developing countries.  Third, 
there is little prospect of an extra-constitutional intervention (e.g. military coup), thereby implying that 
Mongolian policy-makers have longer time horizons than many of their developing country counterparts.  
In other words while MPs may lose elections, they are not likely to lose their life or their freedom, and 
have the chance of winning in the future.    Fourth, Mongolia is not riven by ethno-linguistic cleavages, as 
is common for example in many African democracies, a major advantage given that in natural resource 
rich countries the combination of ethnic rivalries and resource rents has often proven to be explosive.
2  
Fifth, Mongolia is a relatively egalitarian society that does not have traditional, landed elites or other 
―oligarchs‖ that dominate the economic and political landscape.  Sixth, there is a vibrant and free press, 
and numerous civil society advocacy groups, that can provide the necessary checks on the executive.  
Finally, in large part due to the legacy of communism, the education level of the population is high 
compared to other countries at similar income levels, increasing the ability of the population to hold 
policy-makers accountable.   
 
These positive features suggest that Mongolian policy-makers should in theory be able to cooperate to 
achieve reforms.  The key reason why reform is possible is as follows:  Mongolia‘s polity currently does 
not have any dominant ―oligarchs‖ who combine economic and political power; instead this power is 
more evenly distributed among a number of members of parliament.  However, the huge increases in 
natural  resource  rents  that  are  imminent  greatly  increase  the  likelihood  of  certain  MPs  becoming 
oligarchs,  which  would  imply  that  a  minority  of  MPs  would  become  politically  dominant,  thereby 
reducing the power and influence of the majority.  The identity of these ―winners‖ is unknown ex ante, 
given that there are no presently privileged groups (relatively egalitarian polity, and no ethno-linguistic 
divisions).  Therefore, there will be an interest among a majority of the MP‘s (the potential ―losers‖) to 
collectively tie their hands to prevent such as outcome.  The fact that Mongolian political parties are 
reasonably cohesive and programmatic suggests that MPs should, in theory, be able to cooperate for this 
purpose. 
 
This logic implies that the following reforms are incentive compatible: 
 
  MPs  will  support  reforms  that  collectively  tie  their  hands  by  safeguarding  large,  strategic 
investment  projects  from  political  interference.  Given  the  positive  features  of  Mongolia‘s 
political  economy,  there  is  a  recognition  among  MPs  that  they  are  stuck  in  a  ―prisoner‘s 
dilemma‖ situation where what is individually politically rational leads to sub-optimal collective 
outcomes.  No individual MP will find it in his interest to forgo his constituency-specific project 
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to free up the funding that is needed for the large infrastructure projects to develop the Southern 
Gobi mines.  Why?  Because (a) this risks hurting their re-election chances and (b) without some 
safeguarding of the mega-projects, a few privileged MPs — those who are able to secure these 
large contracts — will gain at the expense of a majority whose projects cannot get funded.  The 
identity of these winners will be uncertain ex ante.  The collective result will be that such projects 
will not be developed, which will hurt all MPs.  Therefore, budget, planning, and procurement 
reforms that put in place checks and balances and collectively limit all MPs ability to influence 
these projects, and do not advantage or disadvantage any one particular faction will be incentive 
compatible.   
 
  The corollary to the above, given the strong public demand for seeing some of the benefits of 
natural  resources,  some  constituency  specific  projects  are  politically  necessary.    Indeed, 
protection of mega-projects would need to be part of a bargain that also allows geographical 
targeting  of  some  percentage  of  the  capital  budget.    These  projects  will  most  likely  be  un-
economic; but without them, MPs cannot get re-elected.  The focus should therefore be to ensure 
that (a) these projects are properly prepared, in particular that their cost estimations are accurate 
and community consultation is institutionalized; and (b) that they cumulatively amount to a small 
proportion — less than 20 percent — of the annual capital budget.   
 
  The functional form for safeguarding large, strategic national infrastructure projects will also 
need  to  be  incentive  compatible.    In  Mongolia,  MPs  will  reject  an  all-powerful  Ministry  of 
Finance that combines the planning and budgeting function as this will privilege one political 
faction (e.g. led by the Minister Finance)  over others.  Instead, a division of responsibilities 
between a central planning agency (e.g. a Ministry of Planning), the Ministry of Finance, and line 
ministries  will  be  incentive  compatible  as  it  provides  representation  to  the  various  political 
factions.  The focus of reforms should then be to ensure that proper coordination mechanisms 
exist between the three agencies. 
 
  A  similar  logic  of  safeguarding  large  projects  that  benefit  all  constituencies  while  allowing 
targeted  benefits  to  flow  from  smaller  projects  applies  to  procurement  arrangements.  
International procurement standards of competitive bidding and transparency will be incentive 
compatible for the large mining infrastructure projects precisely because the stakes are so high 
and a particular political faction could become too powerful.  However, for smaller projects 
collusive practices will be difficult to prevent, particularly given the less interest of international 
companies.  
 
The paper is inductive in its structure.   Section 2 analyzes the broader public expenditure patterns in 
Mongolia in order to identify policy-makers priorities (i.e. revealed preferences), and then digs deeper 
into the public investment management system, identifying the main technical and structural weaknesses 
in the system.
3  Section 3 analyzes what interests of key political actors are served by poor investments.  
Given these political incentives, section 4 then proposes some incentive-compatible reform options.  
 
2. Key Issues in Public Investment Management in Mongolia      
 
Mongolia, like many revenue rich and former socialist countries, has a big government as measured by 
revenue collection and public expenditures.  As Figure 1 shows, public expenditures have averaged 30 
percent to 40 percent of GDP over the past 5 years.  Also like many resource-rich countries, expenditures 
have been highly pro-cyclical, in large part reflecting the trend in copper prices.  Mongolia has gone 
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through a classic boom-and-bust cycle from 2005 to 2009, with the non-mining deficit (i.e., expenditures 
relative to non-mining revenues) increasing from a deficit of 1 percent of GDP in 2005 to a deficit of over 
15 percent of GDP in 2008 (Figure 1, left panel), which required large expenditure cuts in capital and 
operations (goods and services), and donor assistance. 
 
The use of the windfall mining revenues provide a good measure of policy-makers‘ preferences as it is 
like ―manna from heaven‖ that can be spent without requiring an additional tax burden on citizens (Figure 
1, right panel).  The 2005 to 2008 boom was used to finance massive increases capital expenditures (from 
3% of GDP in 2005 to 8% of GDP in 2008), across-the-board wage increases for civil servants (from 6% 
of  GDP  to  9%  of  GDP),  and  social  transfers  (from  8%  of  GDP  to  10%  of  GDP).    Within  public 
investments, the roads and transport, and fuel and energy sectors received a bulk of the resources (roughly 
half of the capital expenditures were on these two sectors), followed by education and health.  The social 
transfers were in general untargeted and involved significant cash handouts to all Mongolian citizens with 
children.
4  The expenditure categories that were neglected, relatively, were operations (purchase of goods 
and services, which declined from 11% of GDP to 8% between 2005 and 2008 ) and in particular capital 
repair and maintenance, as described in more detail below. 
 
The problem in Mongolia, unlike many other developing countries, is therefor e not under-spending on 
capital but the poor quality of spending, as elaborated below.  It should also be noted, that apart from its 
broader macro-stability implications — the spending effect resulting in the overheating of the economy 
and real exchange rate appreciation, thereby hurting the non-resource tradables sector — a fiscal cycle 
itself compromises investment quality.  The rapid increase in expenditures — in nominal terms, public 
capital expenditures increased seven-fold in three years — puts a strain on the systems for planning and 
execution, and results in the misallocation of resources.  In other words, if capital expenditures grow this 
rapidly then it is highly likely that they are financing many bad projects as the systems for appraising and 
selecting  projects  cannot  grow  in  capacity  and  sophistication  at  a  similarly  rapid  pace.    Equally 
importantly, the local construction sector usually cannot handle this surge in demand for public projects, 
resulting in myriad implementation problems.  Both smoothing expenditure fluctuations to avoid the 
problem  of  many  new  projects  that  then  cannot  be  funded  during  the  downturn,  and  controlling 
expenditure growth to preserve the quality of the capital asset portfolio is therefore imperative for a 
resource-dependent economy. 
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Figure 1: Mongolia’s public expenditure patterns, 2003-2010 
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As is generally accepted, a good public investment system needs to do two things
5:  
 
  To achieve allocative efficiency, that is to distribute resources as per national priorities, and to 
shift resources from less productive sectors and less effective activities to more productive and 
effective ones.  In other words, ‗spending in the right areas‘; 
  To achieve operational efficiency, or to implement programs and deliver services at the lowest 
cost per unit of output, or conversely, to get the most output for a given set of inputs 
 
As detailed below, Mongolia‘s system is falling short on each of these objectives.   
 
2.1. Low allocative efficiency 
 
There are two main aspects to this problem in Mongolia.  First, the capital budget is fragmented with a 
portfolio skewed towards a large number of small projects  spread across sectors and regions  and an 
underfunding of large infrastructure investments that are critical for economic growth.  Second, there is a 
gross  neglect  of  maintenance  and  capital  repair  leading  to  the  ―build-neglect-rebuild‖  scenario.   
Underlying these expenditure patterns are institutional weaknesses — public investment projects are not 
guided by well thought out strategic priorities, there is little in the form of economic appraisal in the 
planning and budgeting process, and capital budgeting is not done under reasonably disciplined sector 
ceilings and therefore there is no incentive for ministries to prioritize.   
 
The vast majority of projects in the public investment portfolio in Mongolia are small and geographically 
targeted which has resulted in considerable fragmentation of the capital budget into a large number of 
small  projects.   To  take the  example  of  the  2008 capital budget, the total  project  portfolio for  new 
investments of roughly  $900  million  was  spread  out  over  758  projects,  implying  an  average  project 
allocation of $1.2M.  However, the median project size was much lower.  As Figure 2 shows, 66% of 
projects were less than $400,000 in size (500 million MNT), and another 28% were under $4 million.  If 
one considers $8 million (10 billion MNT) as the threshold for a ―large project‖, then only 2% of the 
portfolio was made up of these large projects.  In terms of cost, these large projects accounted for 40% of 
the portfolio.   
 
This focus on smaller projects has come at the 
expense  of  a  relative  neglect  of  large,  critical 
infrastructure investments.  This is evident in the 
inability of policy-makers to increase electricity 
generation capacity, particularly for Ulaanbaatar, 
resulting  in  a  near  crisis  situation  of  power 
shortages.  Specifically, the need for a new Power 
Plant # 5 for Ulaanbaatar has been on the agenda 
for  the  past  decade  but  has  been  repeatedly 
delayed.  More significantly, the government has 
been  unable  to  effectively  plan  for  the  huge 
infrastructure  investments  on  roads,  power 
supply, and water supply, estimated at roughly $5 
billion, to effectively develop the Southern Gobi 
mines. 
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Figure 2:  Distribution of investment projects by size, 
2008 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance 
















Such high fragmentation also reduces allocative efficiency for other reasons.  First, these projects, given 
Mongolia‘s geography (small population and low population density) tend to be uneconomic.  Second, 
fragmentation likely results in duplication and wasted resources.  Third, it likely increases the costs of the 
public investment portfolio as it forgoes some economies of scale.  Fourth, the large number of small 
projects taxes the limited human resource capacity of the line ministries that prepare and implement these 
projects, and of the Ministry of Finance that has to screen and approve them to be financed from the 
budget.  It is therefore likely that a portfolio with many smaller projects will be of poorer quality than a 
portfolio of the same size with fewer, larger projects. 
 
Another  stark  objective  indicator  of  the  misallocation  of  resources  in  Mongolia  is  the  gross  under-
spending on capital maintenance and repair in relation to the country‘s needs.  Due to years of neglect, the 
state of disrepair in the energy and roads sectors is approaching crisis proportions. The electricity sector 
has immediate capital repair needs estimated by the Ministry of Fuel and Energy of about $130 million 
(or 2.5 percent of GDP), and 60% of the national paved road network is in poor condition and in need of 
capital repair and rehabilitation, at an estimated cost of $520 million (or roughly 10 percent of GDP).  As 
against these large needs, and as shown in Figure 3, left panel, capital repair spending increased very little 
in nominal terms during the boom years, as compared to expenditures on transfers, wages and salaries, 
and new domestic investment, and declined as a percentage of new investments (from 10 percent to 6.5 
percent) and of estimated public capital stock (from 4 percent to below 2 percent) between 2003 and 
2010.
6 
There are both technical and political reasons for this under-prioritization.  As elaborated on below, there 
is no economic analysis of projects during budgeting and no requirement that the future recurrent costs of 
projects be specified and be part of the appraisal process.  The deeper political reasons are di scussed in 
the next section. 
 
Ideally, budgets generally, and public investments specifically, need to be guided by policies that are 
grounded in a strategic framework based on sound analysis.  The requirement therefore is both that 
national and sectoral planning documents be of good quality, and that the public investment program be, 
as much as possible, linked to the priorities as established in these documents.  While there are numerous 
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public capital stock was estimated using the methodology in Harberger (2007).  
Figure 3: Spending in capital repairs and maintenance did not benefit from the expenditure boom and has 
declined as a share of new investments and capital stock 
   
Source: Ministry of Finance, World Bank staff calculations.  Public capital stock calculated using perpetual inventory 
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national and sectoral planning documents in Mongolia, these are usually quite weak in quality, and there 
is very little linkage between the documents and the annual capital budget. 
 
Exacerbating this problem of weak strategic guidance is the failure to effectively enforce sector ceilings 
on line ministry budget proposals with the result that there is little incentive for the ministries to prioritize 
their  investment  proposals  given  fiscal  constraints.    For  example,  in  2008  the  investment  proposals 
submitted by all line ministries amounted to 22.6 percent of GDP, as against a ceiling of 8 percent of 
GDP  set  out in the  medium  term  fiscal framework.
7  Politically, this lack of discipline implies that 
ministries are not forced to make tough choices and instead can ―pass the buck‖ to the Ministry of 
Finance by including numerous projects and thereby pleasing all constituencies.   
 
There is no formally institutionalized process of economic appraisal of investment projects in Mongolia.  
The primary budget legislation (the Public Sector Finance and Management Law of 2003) is largely silent 
on the modalities for public investment planning and budgeting, and the Ministry of Finance regulations 
on preparation and prioritization of public investment projects are highly skeletal.  There are no project 
appraisal  guidelines  that  specify  what  economic  and  financial  analysis  needs  to  accompany  project 
proposals, and what will be the basis of appraising these projects.  Without such systematic approaches, it 
is very difficult to determine inter-sectoral and intra-sectoral priorities, and to determine which projects 
are feasible and which are not.  The corollary to this regulatory weakness is the lack of capacity in the line 
ministries  to  conduct economic  analysis, and the  lack  of  capacity  in  the Ministry  of  Finance for  an 
independent review of project proposals based on analytical criteria.
8  The Investment Division of the 
Ministry, which until the recent creation of the new planning agency, had prime responsibility for this 
task has a staff of strength of less than 10, and for all practical purp oses the project review process is 
limited to ensuring that the proposals for new constructions have the necessary technical drawings to 
comply with the requirements of the Construction Law, and that the cost estimates follow the required 
norms. 
 
These problems are particularly severe in projects 
that are inserted by parliament during the annual 
budget  sessions.    Parliament  has  regularly 
significantly  increased  and  altered  the  capital 
budgets submitted by the executive  — In 2008 
for example, the parliament increased the capital 
budget approved by the cabinet from 442 billion 
MNT to 571 billion MNT, replacing and adding 
numerous  projects  to  the  portfolio  (Figure  4).  
Some of these new projects flow from the Local 
Development  Fund,  or  the  allocation  given  to 
each  parliamentarian  for  earmarked  or  ―pork-
barrel‖ spending in their home districts.  These 
constituency funds were introduced in 2003, and 
the allocation per MP has increased hundred-fold 
since then from 10 million MNT per MP in 2003 
to 1 billion MNT per MP in 2010.  Often these 
schemes  identified  under  the  constituency  fund 
are  without  basic  technical  documentation  and  have  even  more  inaccurate  cost  estimations  than  the 
projects proposed by the line ministries.  
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Figure 4:  Parliament has significantly expanded the 
capital budget 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance 
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The Local Development Fund amounts to approximately 15% of the capital budget.  However, the total 
number of constituency-specific projects is much larger, as many projects proposed by line ministries also 
have this feature.   As noted above, 66% of projects are small and often geographically targeted, a more 
accurate measure of the scale of constituency-specific schemes. 
 
 2.2. Low operational efficiency 
 
These problems in allocative efficiency are compounded by problems in the project cycle.  Delays in 
project completion are common and significant.  65 percent of roads projects completed between 2005 
and 2009 had time overruns, more than doubling the original completion time in some cases, while 73 
percent of on-going projects have been extended.  These delays reflect two factors: poor planning and 
inaccurate cost estimation, and weaknesses in the construction sector.  Roughly 32% of these projects 
were  delayed  due  to  upfront  problems  of  planning,  49%  were  due  to  the  downstream  problems  in 
implementation due to the weak capacity of the construction companies, and 19% of the projects were 
delayed due to both reasons.  
  
Inaccurate cost estimation usually translates into time over-runs primarily because in Mongolia the capital 
budget is approved and appropriated project-by-project by the parliament and increasing the budgeted 
cost of a project requires a budget amendment.  There are three main reasons for the poor cost estimation: 
use of overly simple methods to estimate costs that served as the basis for project appropriations, projects 
inserted into the budget by parliament that were not subjected to cost estimation to the same degree as 
executive-proposed  capital  projects,  and increases  in  building  material  prices, particularly  during  the 
inflationary period of 2008-09. 
 
Given Mongolia‘s short construction season (from May to October), the initial months after the capital 
budget is approved by parliament in December are critical for  timely implementation of the project.  
Procurement however is a major bottleneck in the process, due to both unrealistic cost estimates during 
project preparation and lack of procurement capacity in the executing agencies.  As the capital budget has 
the force of law, and includes both the overall cost of the project and allocation for the particular fiscal 
year, no bid can be awarded that is above the approved cost of a project.  Inaccurate cost estimates during 
project preparation imply that on many occasions the bids received do not fall within these cost ceilings, 
and on average procurement can take 6 months.  In the last two years this problem has been compounded 
by high inflation that has resulted in significant cost escalation during implementation.  In many cases 
line ministries have had to seek parliamentary amendments to the capital budget to increase the cost 
allocation  of  projects  to  make  them  more  in  line  with  market  rates.    This  problem  also  encourages 
construction companies‘ compromise on quality in order to avoid incurring losses.
9  These procurement 
delays are particularly severe for the projects that are added by the parliament as they usually have no 
accompanying engineering designs.     
 
Weaknesses in the legal framework for procurement also raise questions on the quality of capital budget 
execution.  Procurement is decentralized in Mongolia to the line ministries and agencies, with the 
Procurement Policy and Coordination Department of the Ministry of Finance setting policy and providing 
the regulatory and monitoring function, and conducting pr ior reviews for large contracts.   As a recent 
Government‘s  audit  report  details,  the  major  problem  in  this  framework  is  the  provision  for  direct 
contracting that was introduced in 2007 in the roads and energy sector.  In 2007, 125 billion MNT, or 34 
percent  of  all  of  contracts,  were  awarded  through  direct  contracting,  often  with  no  accompanying 
technical documentation with allegedly numerous technically unqualified, and politically well connected, 
companies winning construction contracts (Government of Mongolia, 2008).  Many road construction 
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projects were also broken down into smaller schemes to enable smaller and less qualified companies to be 
directly awarded the contract.  This practice of direct contracting was discontinued in 2008 and 2009, but 
remains allowable in the Procurement Law. 
 
Figure 5: Time overruns in the ten sampled projects 
 
Source: Department of Roads 
 
The findings from case studies of a sample of road sector projects corroborate the findings of the audit 
report.  Of the total sample of ten, four projects were executed through direct contracting while the 
remainder went through the normal tendering process.  As portrayed in Figure 5, seven of the ten projects 
had time overruns, with an average completion time of 3.1 years compared to the original plan time of 1.8 
years, or an overrun of 70 percent.  The directly contracted projects were the worst performers, with an 
average time overrun of 2.25 years (or 180 percent).  
 
Other reasons for the time overruns are bottlenecks in financing and the lack of implementation capacity 
of construction companies.  The Ministry of Finance exercises strict input controls in the execution of the 
budget; the capital budget is approved project-by-project as law by parliament annually, even for multi-
year projects, there is no multiyear appropriation, nor any provisions for carry -over funding.  Line 
ministries have no authority to reallocate funds across projects based on revised cost estimates or pace of 
implementation, and any unspent allocation gets re-appropriated to the Ministry of Finance at the end of 
the fiscal year.  For multi-year projects there is no prioritization process that would ensure that projects 
that are being implemented well would receive their necessary annual allocation.  
 
3. The Politics of Public Expenditures    
 
The assumption behind this paper is that these technical weaknesses  to a considerable extent  reflect 
political choices, and that several perverse incentives need to be addressed if public investments are to 
improve in Mongolia.  Clearly there are a number of important political actors in this process.  This paper 
focuses on members of parliament.  The reason for this focus is both that the Mongolian parliament has 
considerable formal budgetary authority and that individual MPs exercise significant informal influence 
over the executive in project selection and execution. 
 
Mongolia is a parliamentary democracy based on a majoritarian electoral system  with elections held 
regularly every four years since the transition from socialism in 1992.  The two largest political parties are 
the Mongolian People‘s Revolutionary Party (MPRP) and the Democratic Party; the MPRP, which was 
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the old communist party, has won clear majorities in three elections (1992, 2000, and 2008).  The parties 
are not particularly distinguished by ideology — for example, both have campaigned on broadly populist 
platforms of redistributing mining wealth to the people in the form of large, untargeted cash transfer 
programs, and of investment projects distributed across the country —  and both are characterized by 
factionalism. 
 
Figure 6: The formal budgetary authority of Mongolia’s parliament stands out in comparative 
perspective 
 
Source: Author‘s calculations based on Wehner (2006).  The index is a sum of three indicators normalized to range 
between 0 and 100: legislative powers of amendment; consequences of non-approval of the budget; and executive 
flexibility on budget appropriations 
 
The parliament in Mongolia exercises unusual budgetary powers.   As shown in  Figure 6, Mongolia‘s 
parliament  ranks  in  the  top  quintile  in  formal  budgetary  authority  (powers  of  budget  amendment, 
consequences of non-approval of the budget, and executive flexibility in budgetary appropriations).  As 
noted above, this formal authority has been repeatedly used by MPs to amend the budget in general and 
the capital budget in particular.  Equally important is the informal political interference in the execution 
of the overall capital budget through in particular the influencing the contracting process.  As discussed 
above, the most egregious example of this influence was the large number of contracts awarded without 
competitive bidding in 2007.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that a prime motivation for these contracts 
was to generate political support from wealthy and influential individuals ahead of the national elections 
in 2008.  In general, political interference in the award of contracts is known to be considerable even 
when competitive bidding is done de jure, in particular given the small size of the formal sector in 
Mongolia, and the close personal links between parliamentarians and the business community.  












































These incentives of elected officials are a common feature of developing country democracies.  The sub-
sections below examine the relevant academic literature on political economic resource allocation in 
democratic settings and then apply the lessons from this literature to the Mongolian context.  
 
3.1 Lessons from the literature    
 
There are three relevant academic literatures to understand the politics of public investments in Mongolia.  
The  first  is  the  literature  that  has  focused  on  the  political  economy  of  macro-economic  policy,  in 
particular the incentives that result in fiscal indiscipline.  The second is the literature that has attempted to 
explain  why  democratic  governments  that  are  ostensibly  accountable  to  voters  would  systematically 
under-provide public goods thereby hurting the welfare of these voters.  And third, is the huge literature 
on the political economy of reform. 
 
Fiscal indiscipline is usually explained in the political economy literature as a common pool resource 
dilemma in which the political and institutional structure of the country allows for decentralized spending 
determination.  Specifically, policy-makers have the ability to target spending to particular constituencies 
using  general  tax  revenues  that  are  shared  across  all  the  constituencies.    Under  these  conditions, 
politicians have the incentive to overspend as they internalize the full benefit of the local expenditures but 
only bear a fraction of the increased costs associated with these expenditures.
10  This negative externality 
generates over-spending and fiscal indiscipline.  These problems are likely to be exacerbated  in natural 
resource-rich environments in which the revenues flow from resource rents rather than taxes.  The 
literature suggests that both centralizing fiscal authority and cooperative bargaining are conducive to 
overcome the inefficiency and thus are able to promote fiscal discipline.  Several empirical studies have 
shown that budget institutions have an impact on fiscal outcomes in a variety of samples of developed and 
developing countries.
11 
   
Market failures are also fundamental to explaining why democracies can under-provide public goods that 
help the majority of the population (and voters).  The huge literature on clientelism attempts to explain 
this puzzle by the relative inability of politicians to internalize the benefits of public as opposed to private 
good provision.  These targeted goods can be ―pork-barrel‖ projects, or projects that benefit specific 
localities, or ―rents‖ distributed to influential groups in exchange for their political support.   
    
Bates  (1981)  classic  formulation  of  clientelism  argued  that  economic  interests  that  can  organize 
collectively can provide politicians with political support, which creates an incentive for politicians to 
provide rents to these groups.  Society suffers because the particular interests of these groups are inimical 
to broader development.  Cross-country variations in development could then be attributed to either the 
strength and number of interest groups (Olson 1984), with for example in pluralistic societies multiple 
interest groups competing for state attention cancelling each other out (North, Wallis, Weingast 2006); or 
whether or not these special interests were antagonistic to economic development (e.g. Acemoglu and 
Johnson 2002); or on the whether or not economic activity is concentrated or dispersed (Dunning 2008).   
 
More recent work has shown that politicians will have an incentive to provide targeted benefits to their 
supporters in situations where they will not receive electoral benefits from providing public goods either 
due to the inability to mobilize support for public goods across ethnic groups (Easterly & Levine 1997, 
Alesina et al 2005, Keefer 2010), voters lack of information about the actions of individual politicians 
(Besley, 2006), or lack of credibility of national political organizations for providing these goods (Keefer 
2007).   
                                                 
10 Weingast et al (1981), Velasco (2000) 
11 Alesina et al. (1996). 13 
 
  
Information can also be a key reason as to why democracies can produce outcomes that hurt the median 
voter.    Politicians  care  about  getting  elected,  and  they  will  focus  on  policies  and  will  emphasize 
expenditure in areas that will maximize their electoral fortunes.  Importantly, getting elected is also 
crucially contingent on information – specifically, it requires that voters are able to connect improvements 
or deteriorations in their welfare to the actions of a particular politician.  In other words, politicians must 
be able to credibly take credit for these improvements.  This importance of information implies that 
politicians are likely to be more responsive to the more informed group of citizens, and as a result focus 
more on private goods, or targeted benefits, as opposed to public goods that benefit the majority.
12   
 
Alternatively, even if voters are informed they may not consider as credible politician‘s promises to 
improve public goods.  A credible politician is one that can provide targeted goods to those citizens he 
develops a personal interaction with, which are typically influential people from his constituency.  This 
incentive for targeted goods is also driven by the fact that elections are expensive and a politician usually 
has to raise funds himself to finance his campaign.  The exchange of rents for campaign contributions as 
well as votes is then another incentive for the under-provision of public goods and the over-provision of 
targeted goods. 
 
A number of institutional variables may impact clientelism.  There is a large literature that has explored 
the  impact  of  regime  type  (presidential  vs.  parliamentary)  and  electoral  rules  (majoritarian  vs. 
proportional)  on  targeted  spending.    No  conclusive  results  have  emerged,  primarily  due  to  the 
considerable heterogeneity of institutional arrangements within the above stylized categories.  There is an 
emerging literature on the influence of political parties on clientelism which suggests that more cohesive 
political parties, and stronger voter attachment to political parties — or partisan voting — reduces the 




There are numerous refinements to the above argument.  Robinson and Verdier (2003), and Robinson and 
Torvik(2005) ask the question why clientelism should necessarily be so inefficient, manifesting either in 
the form of public sector employment or ―white elephant‖ projects with negative social return.  The 
answer is that clientelism is inefficient precisely because this inefficiency solves the commitment problem 
(i.e. why would a voter honor his ‗contract‘ by voting for the politician after receiving the private good?): 
only by maintaining that particular politician responsible for the rents in office can clients hope to keep 
receiving the rents.  If the rents were efficient, then all politicians would have an incentive to keep 
supplying them and voters would have no incentive to vote in a particular politician.     
 
To summarize this literature, public goods are under-supplied and private goods over-supplied because (a) 
rents can be exchanged for campaign contributions; (b) rents can be targeted which solves the information 
problem and the attribution problem (the politician can take credit for them); (c) the provision of rents 
implies that a politician is credible; and (d) rents will only continue if voters re-elect that particular 
politician, thereby solving the commitment problem. 
   
Finally, there is the huge literature on the political economy of economic and political reform.  Here, we 
focus on two works of particular relevance to the argument of this paper.  One, by Fernandez and Rodrik 
(1991) shows how the combination of individual specific uncertainty concerning whether you will win or 
lose from reform, together with majority rule, may cause socially beneficial reforms to be blocked even 
though everybody knows that a majority will gain from reform ex post.  The logic rests on the fact that 
                                                 
12     Important recent works in this literature include Keefer (2002); Keefer and Khemani (2003) 
13   Keefer and Khemani (2003) 
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the identity of the winners and losers is uncertain ex ante, and the winners cannot credibly commit to 
compensate the losers ex post.  A second, by Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) explains the puzzle of why 
elites may block growth enhancing reforms by the ―political replacement effect‖ — i.e., while reforms 
may increase growth they may also foster changes that result in the elites being removed from power; 
anticipating this, the elites will block reforms.  The relationship between blocking reforms and political 
competition is non-monotonic.  Both political elites that are subject to competition and those that are 
highly entrenched are likely to reform.  With intense political competition, elites prefer to innovate, 
because otherwise they are likely to be replaced. With a high degree of entrenchment, incumbents are 
willing to innovate, because they are not afraid of losing political power. Instead, it is elites that are 
somewhat entrenched but still fear replacement that will block innovation. 
 
3.2. Applying the lessons to Mongolia 
 
Given the numerous socio-economic and institutional variables identified in the literature, and the public 
expenditure  patterns  and  problems  in  the  public  investment  system  discussed  above,  where  does 
Mongolia stack-up in terms of policy-makers incentives for providing sound public investments?  The 
following negative and positive aspects are suggestive: 
 
The negative aspects: 
 
  The combination of high parliamentary spending authority, large natural resource rents, the 
majoritarian electoral system with MPs representing specific geographical constituencies, and 
need for constituency-specific spending for re-election purposes create a classic common 
pool problem that encourages over-spending by legislators and is the main political cause for 
the boom-and-bust cycle.   
 
  The fragmentation of the capital budget — large number of small, often uneconomic projects, 
targeted  to  specific  geographical  areas  —  can  be  explained  by  the    need  for  individual 
members of parliament to cultivate their own, individual-specific political support in order to 
win elections.  
 
  The relative neglect of large, nationally important infrastructure is suggestive of the inability 
of parliamentarians to work towards cooperate goals.  The main reason for this is that given 
that institutional arrangements for public investments are weak large infrastructure projects 
carry a particular risk of political capture that can threaten to create a dominant political 
faction given the high potential rents involved.  Following Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) the 
identity  of  these  winners  is  uncertain  ex  ante;  and  given  this,  following  Acemoglu  and 
Robinson (2006), the MPs have an incentive to block such large projects.  
 
  The election cycle encourages short time horizons in MPs which creates the lack of interest in 
maintaining capital assets, resulting in the ―build-neglect-re-build‖ project scenario.  
.  
  Procurement  irregularities  can  similarly  be  explained  by  clientelist  pressures;  MPs  trade 
construction contracts for campaign finance and political support.   
 
The positive aspects: 
 
  Even though Mongolia‘s political parties are factionalized, they are more programmatic than 
many in other developing country democracies, as is detailed below.  Programmatic parties 
are  those  in  which  members  share  common  policy  preferences  and  where  citizens  hold 15 
 
politicians  from  the  party  collectively  responsible  for  failure  to  pursue  policies  that  are 
consistent with the party‘s program.  The untargeted social transfer programs of both the 
MPRP and the Democratic Party are indicative of programmatic elements. 
 
  Even  though  individual  MP‘s  face  considerable  uncertainty  regarding  their  re-election 
prospects, which encourages them to focus on ―consuming now‖ rather than ―investing for 
the future‖, Mongolia is a relatively stable democratic system with little prospect for a regime 
change.  Therefore, there is some assurance for individual MPs that while they may lose the 
next election, they can eventually return to power, and will not risk getting jailed through a 
military coup.    
 
  Mongolia has some socio-economic advantages that reduce clientelist pressures.  First is its 
ethnic homogeneity and strong sense of national identity.  Second, is its high and growing 
level of urbanization (Ulaanbaatar has 40% of the country‘s population)  that will reduce 
incentives for pork-barrel funding to rural communities.  Third, is the high education level 
(universal literacy and over 30% tertiary enrollment rates) that should ameliorate some of the 
informational roots of clientelism.  Fourth, is the relative egalitarian nature of the society and 
the absence of landed elites and powerful oligarchs. 
 
In  particular,  reform  is  possible  because 
Mongolian political parties, while factionalized, 
do have a corporate identity that sets them apart 
from  political  parties  in  many  developing 
countries.  There are numerous indicators of the 
programmatic nature of these parties.  First, there 
is reasonably strong partisan identification among 
the  electorate  because  of  the  strong  grass-roots 
presence  of  the  MPRP,  which  as  the  former 
communist party, has existed for over 80 years.  
Second, there has been virtually no switching of 
MPs  from  one  party  to  another  —  a  common 
feature  in  many  low  and  middle  income 
democracies — suggesting a reasonable degree of 
corporate  identify.    As  shown  in  Figure  7, 
between  1996  and  2004,  there  were  no  MPRP 
MP‘s  who  had  in  the  past  been  parliamentarians  from  the  Democratic  party.    Similarly  there  were 
virtually no Democratic party MPs who in the past were with the MPRP.  These results are particularly 
striking  given  that the  Democratic  Party  is  a significant political force (it  has  been in  power twice, 
between 1996 and 2000, and between 2004 and 2008 in a coalition with the MPRP) and therefore would 
certainly attract the interest of MPRP MPs.  Third, there are virtually no independent candidates who win 
elections.  Fourth, the size of Mongolia‘s cabinet has remained modest, at between 11 and 15, over the 
past two decades, even during coalition governments of 1996 and 2004, suggesting that MPs allegiance 
was not required to be bought with a cushy cabinet post to prevent defection.   
 
There  are  also  institutional  rules  with  parliament  that  help  collective  action  by  MPs.    In  particular 
parliamentary  standing  committees,  such  as  those  on  the  budget,  social  policy,  and  state  structure, 
exercise considerable power, and their membership is based on seniority.  While budget amendment 
sessions are essentially a time of intense bargaining as individual MPs lobby to get their pet projects into 
the  budget,  the  process  carried  out  under  the  authority  of  the  budget  standing  committee,  with  the 
chairman of the committee exercising considerable authority.  It is therefore important for individual MPs 
Figure 7:  Mongolian MPs do not switch parties 
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to have good standing with the parliamentary party hierarchy in order to get their projects included, which 
encourages discipline.       
 
4. Incentive Compatible Reforms     
 
4.1 Fiscal responsibility legislation 
 
The ability of MPs to cooperate to address these problems was demonstrated with the passage in 2010 of 
the Fiscal Stability Law (FSL) that mandates that the annual budget be based on fiscal rules that limit 
expenditure volatility, make expenditures countercyclical, and control expenditure growth.  While it is too 
early to tell whether the FSL will be adequately implemented, discussions with MPs revealed that the law 
was passed because the MPs appreciated that they were stuck in a ‗prisoner‘s dilemma‘ type of problem: 
that  while  it  was  individually  politically  rational  for  each  MP  to  over-spend  for  the  benefit  of  his 
constituency, as per the ―common pool‖ problem identified in the literature, this would lead to fiscal 
crises and macroeconomic instability that would be collectively irrational.  The key was that the FSL 
collectively tied all MPs hands thereby not conferring any advantage or disadvantage to any particular 
constituency or faction.  It was therefore incentive compatible.   
 
The fact that MPs could agree on this legislation is suggestive of the positive features of Mongolia‘s 
political economy listed above that allowed for a cooperative solution to this problem.  It also suggests 
that similar reforms that collectively tie MPs hands are  incentive compatible and will be the key to 
improving the public investment management system. 
 
 4.2. Institutional checks on large and strategically important infrastructure projects 
 
As noted, Mongolia‘s capital budget is very fragmented with numerous small projects and very few large 
projects.  The main political reason for this fragmentation is clientelism: numerous smaller projects allow 
each MP to be able to target projects to his constituency as well as to exchange rents in the form of 
contracts for campaign financing and political support.  However, the need to develop the Southern Gobi 
mines implies that considerable budgetary funding has to be shifted from the smaller projects to the large 
infrastructure ―mega projects‖.  In other words the composition of the public investment portfolio will 
have to shift from large number of small projects, to fewer, and on average larger projects.   
 
This change in the public investment portfolio has serious political ramifications for individual MPs as (a) 
it risks hurting their re-election chances as constituency-specific projects are cut and (b) without some 
safeguarding of the mega-projects, a few privileged MPs — those who are able to secure these large 
contracts — will gain at the expense of a majority whose projects cannot be funded.  These privileged 
factions will then become politically dominant; i.e. they will become oligarchs.
14  Given the fluid nature 
of political alliances in Mongolia, helped by the fact that there are no deep and entrenched ethnic or tribal 
cleavages, it is likely that the identity of the winners is uncertain ex ante and the winners cannot credibly 
commit to compensate the losers   ex post.
15  Each individual MP will therefore have an interest in 
opposing the cutting of his pet project to fund the mega projects; the collective result will be that  such 
projects will not be developed, which will hurt all MPs.   
 
Following the logic of the passage of the FSL  MPs should have an interest in institutional mechanisms 
that protects these  large projects from political interference, thereby collectively tying their hands and 
solving this ―prisoner‘s dilemma‖.  Given Mongolia‘s positive stylized facts of ethnic homogeneity and 
regime stability, each MP has a relatively strong interest in the development of the Southern Gobi mines 
                                                 
14 Following the logic of the resource curse literature. 
15 Following the logic of Fernandez and Rodrik (1991). 17 
 
and therefore of increasing the size of the ―economic pie‖, as compared to, for example, their counterparts 
in many African countries where distributional, zero-sum conflicts among rival groups of elites, often 
along ethnic lines, predominate.   MPs should have an interest in ensuring that the necessary infrastructure 
is built to enable the minerals to be produced and exported.  This would imply that reforms to improve 
project appraisal and to protect it from political influence should be incentive compatible.  These reforms, 
following Rajaram et al (2010) imply an institution that serves as a ―gatekeeper‘ to ensure that only 
projects that gone through some form of project appraisal based on cost-benefit analysis are approved and 
funded.  
 
4.3. Constituency specific projects should be “formalized” 
 
Given the above shift in the public investment portfolio, it is likely that the need for geographically 
targeted projects will only increase in the future as (a) constituency demands to see the results of the 
mineral revenues will get stronger with the development of the mines; and (b) a smaller portion of the 
capital budget will be discretionary, given the institutional checks on the mega projects.  Each MP will 
have an incentive to exercise control over these smaller, pork-barrel schemes so as to capture all the 
political benefits from them.  Therefore, any reforms that try to either eliminate the Local Development 
Fund, or to prevent MPs from exercising influence over these constituency schemes will not be incentive 
compatible and will likely fail.      
 
Instead, a better reform strategy would be to take these incentives of politicians as given and to try and 
improve  the  quality  of  these  geographically  targeted  projects.    In  other  words,  local  development 
objectives  should  be  formalized  and  made  explicit.    This  formalization  can  be  done  by  explicitly 
including  the  Local  Development  Fund  in  the  budget  preparation  process  so  that  line  ministries  are 
responsible for preparing these schemes, as opposed to the current practice in which these schemes are 
introduced during the parliamentary budget debates, thereby not allowing for sufficient preparatory time. 
Giving line ministries responsibility early in the budget cycle should improve the cost estimation of these 
schemes.  Some aggregate limits — e.g. less than 20 percent of the capital budget — on the amount of 
annual  funding  for  these  schemes  could  also  be  introduced,  as  part  of  this  bargain.    Consultation 
mechanisms with local level governments and local communities in identifying these projects could also 
be institutionalized. 
 
Given Mongolia‘s low population density, these schemes will likely remain uneconomic from a strict 
cost-benefit calculus.  Formalizing them will serve to at least improve the cost side of the equation; and to 
reduce  the  incentive  to  capture  rents  from  the  large  projects  that  are  essential  for  Mongolia‘s 
development.    
 
4.4. Institutional arrangements for project appraisal: Function vs. form 
 
The  above  suggests  that  budget  and  planning  legislation  that  specifies  that  all  projects  of  national 
importance  above  a  certain  size  threshold  would  need  to  go  through  a  reasonably  rigorous  and 
safeguarded appraisal process would find support among MPs, provided that it is credible and specified in 
the legal framework.  The next question then is what form would such an institutional arrangement for a 
―gatekeeper‖ function take?  
 
The standard textbook advice is that planning and finance functions should be unified in a powerful 
Ministry  of  Finance  which  would  serve  as  the  gatekeeper  to  appraise  and  budget  public  investment 
projects.  To quote Weber (2007): 
 
Separation of responsibility for current and development expenditures between two ministries – typically 
the ministry of finance and the ministry of planning (or economy) respectively – is often a major obstacle 18 
 
to effective budget integration… Internationally, there is increasing recognition and acceptance of the 
principle that budget planning, presentation, management and accounting and control functions can be 
conducted more effectively within one central agency: typically a ministry of finance. 
 
The  received  wisdom  therefore  is  that  separating  the  planning  and  finance  function  leads  to  dual 
budgeting and therefore should be avoided, and forms the standard policy advice of the International 
Monetary Fund. 
 
Political economy factors however, suggest that such a powerful Ministry of Finance is not compatible 
with MPs incentives for precisely the reasons above — it would (a) risk creating a privileged political 
faction (the one that controls the MoF) and (b) also risk MPs‘ discretion over smaller projects.  Currently 
Mongolia‘s Ministry of Finance has a staff of roughly 150, which has been inadequate to enable it in 
particular to perform the policy analysis, planning, and budget preparation function.  However, proposals 
to increase the Ministry‘s staffing have been repeatedly rejected by parliament, in large part because all 
central ministries are small and increasing the MoF‘s staff would create a political imbalance and would 
result in similar demands from all other ministries, demands that would have backing from the different 
political factions represented by these ministries.   
 
Instead, Mongolia has recently created a new planning agency, the National Development and Innovation 
Committee (NDIC) under the prime minister‘s office.  Debates amongst policy-makers preceding the 
creation of the NDIC included the option of strengthening the planning function in the MoF, but this 
option was rejected due to fears that it would result in a too powerful Ministry.  While the creation of the 
NDIC risks fragmenting planning from budgeting and there are risks that without proper coordination 
between the agency and the MoF, and proper distribution of responsibilities, a dual budget system will 
develop,  separating  the  planning  and  budgeting  function  is  incentive  compatible.  And  it  is  indeed 
possible that if effective technical coordination does develop between the two, then the separation of the 
planning and budgeting function would create the necessary checks and balances to prevent the ―capture‖ 
of one Ministry by political forces.  This would ―divide and conquer‖ strategy may be especially effective 
if the Ministers of the planning agency (in this case the prime minister) and the Minister of Finance are 
from opposing political parties.  In this case collusion would be required to ensure that a bad project gets 
included in, say, a multi-year public investment plan and then also gets funded in the annual capital 
budget. 
 
The incentive compatible reform would therefore be to give a central planning agency sufficient authority 
to act as the gatekeeper for large, strategically important projects, and then to ensure that the coordination 
between the MoF and the planning agency is strong.  These mechanisms would need to be enshrined in 
the primary planning and budget legislation. 
 
A second institutional form question concerns the division of responsibilities between line ministries and 
the central planning agency in project appraisal for these large projects.  Again, the logic of incentive 
compatible reform would imply that these responsibilities would need to be shared as the central planning 
agency will also never have enough staff to appraise all projects.  Therefore, the NDIC would have to be 
limited  to  only  large  and  strategically  important  projects,  while  line  ministries  would  need  to  be 
responsible for appraising smaller projects.  
 
4.5. Procurement reform 
  
A  similar  logic  of  safeguarding  large  projects  that benefit  all  constituencies while  allowing  targeted 
benefits to flow from smaller projects applies to procurement arrangements.  International procurement 
standards of competitive bidding and transparency  will be incentive compatible for the large mining 
infrastructure projects precisely because the stakes are so high and a particular political faction could 19 
 
become too powerful.  However, for smaller projects collusive practices will be difficult to prevent, 
particularly given the less interest of international companies.  
 
This logic helps us understand the current thrust of procurement reform in Mongolia which is to centralize 
the  procurement  of  large  projects  while  giving  local  governments  more  authority  over  procurement 
arrangements for smaller projects.  Presently line ministries do the procurement for all projects in their 
portfolio,  with  the  Ministry  of  Finance  responsible  for  setting  procurement  policies  and  monitoring, 
including providing no objections on projects above certain thresholds.  However, numerous MPs have 
proposed that authority over large procurements should be taken away from line ministries and given to a 
newly  established  central  tenders  board,  either  under  the  Ministry  of  Finance  or  the  State  Property 
Committee, while local governments should be given procurement authority over smaller projects.   The 
belief  is  that  a  centralized  tenders  board  can  be  more  easily  safeguarded  than  a  line  ministry;  and 
conversely a local government will be more susceptible to influence than a ministry. 
 
It should be noted that there is no consensus on whether or not centralizing procurement will safeguard it.  
On the one hand, if sufficient independence is given to the procurement authority, with strong monitoring 
mechanisms in place, the risk of irregularities can be reduced.  On the other hand, centralizing authority 
over large contracts can also make the agency an attractive target.  The above logic implies that ensuring 
that the central tenders board has the necessary institutional safeguards would be incentive compatible, 
and therefore should be a focus of reform efforts.  
 
4.6 Parliamentary procedural reforms  
 
Reforms to parliamentary procedures that rationalize the budget amendment process are another potential 
area of incentive compatible reforms.  Currently there are few restrictions on individual MPs in Mongolia 
on introducing budget amendments during the budget sessions, with the result that numerous additional 
public investment schemes are introduced greatly changing the nature of the capital budget.  While the 
FSL will impose aggregate limits on these amendments, so that the budget in the aggregate must comply 
with  fiscal rules,  it  will  not  impact  the  composition  of  the  budget.    In  addition  to  safeguarding  the 
appraisal and procurement of large projects, MPs will also have an interest in ensuring that the funding 
for these projects does not get chipped away by the introduction of numerous smaller pork-barrel schemes 
through budget amendments. 
 
One method would be to change the Law on Parliamentary Procedures by restricting the individual MP‘s 
ability to introduce amendments.  In Brazil for example, another country where individual MP‘s make 
considerable  amendments  to  the  budget  resulting  in  over-spending,  a  fiscal  crises  in  1993  prompted 
procedural changes that limited the ability of individual legislators to propose amendments, and instead 
gave  priority  to  collective  amendments.
16  Following the Brazil example, Mongolia could introduce 
procedural changes that for example (a)  limit an individual MP‘s ability to introduce amendments by 
limiting these amendments to only to small projects and (b) require collective amendments — support 
from a majority or even two-thirds of MPs —  to amend large, strategically important projects.  These 
separate domains for individual and collective amendments follow the logic of allowing MPs discretion 
over small, constituency-specific schemes while protecting the large, nationally important ones.   
   
 
 
5. Conclusion     
 
                                                 
16 Alston et al (2005). 20 
 
There  is  an  emerging  recognition  in  the  international  financial  institutions  that  standard  technical 
solutions for addressing public financial and sector management weaknesses in developing countries that 
are not sensitive to local ―context‖ have not worked and are unlikely to work.  The need for political 
economy  analysis  is repeatedly  emphasized;  but there  is  also  considerable  skepticism  about  whether 
political  economy  work  can  provide  a  different  and  better,  ―second  best‖  solution.    In  general  this 
skepticism is valid — the academic political economy literature is excellent for showing why particular 
pathologies exist, but less suited to providing policy guidance for some of the questions that confront 
institutions like the World Bank.  
 
It is hoped that this paper has provided an example of how this political economy literature can be used to 
develop  specific  and  more  workable  policy  recommendations.  This  literature  provides  a  number  of 
conceptual frameworks that can be used to analyze a particular situation in a particular context, and for 
testing whether potential technical solutions would be compatible with the interests of key policy-makers.  
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